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Abstract
Calling upon both positive and normative economics, we attempt to characterize the issues
at stake in the current international negotiations on climatic change. We begin (section 2) by
reviewing the main features of the Protocol. Then (Section 3), we identify by means of an
elementary economic model the main concepts involved: optimality, non cooperation,
coalitional stability. We observe (Section 4) that "business-as-usual", "no regrets" and other
domestic policies are alternative ways to conceive of the non cooperative equilibrium
prevailing before the negotiations. Which one should be retained? Data suggest that the
prevailing situation is a mixed one, exhibiting characteristics of several of these policies. We
then turn (Section 5) to interpreting the Protocol. While there is no firm basis to assert that the
emission quotas chosen at Kyoto correspond to optimal emissions (although they are a step
in the right direction), economic and game theoretical arguments are put forward to support
the view that for achieving these emission quotas, trading ensures efficiency, as well as
coalitional stability for the agreement provided it is adopted at the largest scale i.e. worldwide.
Finally, it is argued in Section 6 that beyond the Kyoto Protocol, the achievement of
coalitionally stable optimality at the world level is a real possibility with trading, provided
agreement can be reached in the future as to appropriate reference emission levels, in
particular as far as developing countries are concerned.
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1. Introduction: Cooperation at the world level, from Rio to Kyoto
Our central theme in this paper is the one of cooperation at the world
level on the issue of climatic change. We start from the facts and then try to
enlighten them by means of ideas provided by economics and game theory.
The negotiations on climate change that have been taking place since the
late 1980's within the United Nations institutions6 are obviously a quasi-
worldwide process, judging by the length of the list of countries7 participating.
But these negotiations, prior to the Kyoto meeting, had led only to a
"framework convention", signed in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, that was little more
than a declaration of intentions. The real issue was then: are the continuing
negotiations eventually going to lead to a sustainable agreement bearing on
effective actions that is also worldwide? Or will they lead to a breaking up of
the countries into separate blocks, each acting to the best of its own interests?
The Kyoto Protocol, signed in December 1997, is the major development
in the post-Rio evolution of these negotiations. Its importance lies mainly in the
fact that it bears on effective actions to be taken by countries, actions that are
recognized as binding commitments by them.
However, according to the Protocol, not all countries have to take specific
actions. As our summary presentation will report more in detail below,
commitments to quantified emissions reduction or limitation are mentioned
only for the so-called "Annex 1" parties8. The rôle of the other countries in the
agreement, while not ignored, is much less precisely specified.
The natural question that then arises is whether the Kyoto Protocol is to be
considered as just an "Annex I" Protocol; or is it to be seen, after further thought
and beyond the appearances, as a worldwide Protocol? Below, we defend the
second thesis, first on the basis of our own conviction, but also because we
think we can support it by means of well established conceptual tools of
economics and game theory.
                                                
6 For a thorough account of the scientific evidence on the state of the problem, the reader is referred
to the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and in particular to the
contribution of its Working Group III (see  under IPCC 1995 in our references below).
7 178 in Rio, 159 in Kyoto and 161 in Buenos Aires.
8 "Annex 1" (to the Rio Convention text) countries are the OECD countries, those of the former
Soviet Union and those of the eastern European economies in transition.5
For the applied economist, the Kyoto Protocol offers an exceptionally rich
combination of opportunities to put theory into use, both in a positive and a
normative way — that is, for explaining events as well as for advising on
decision making. Indeed, several strands of theory are involved as we shall
show: externalities of the Samuelsonian public good type, Nash non
cooperative equilibria, worldwide Pareto optimality, cooperative solution
concepts, and finally Walrasian market equilibria with their Edgeworthian
coalitional stability... . All these are involved!
2. Main features of the Protocol
We briefly state here what the main features of the Protocol are, from the
point of view of our arguments to follow:
(i)  Dated  emission  quotas, expressed in percentages of 1990 emissions, are
established for Annex I countries, to be met around 2010.
(ii) The principles of (a) emissions trading by countries (or by their nationals) and
of (b) joint implementation are established for Annex I countries.
(iii)A clean development mechanism (CDM) is established as a way to involve non
Annex-1 countries (especially developing ones) in some particular form of
joint implementation and emissions trading.
No explicit provision in the Protocol mentions the introduction of targets
for non Annex-1 countries. But it is expected that this will take place in the
future through the general review clauses of the Protocol and of the
Convention.
Trade in emissions will be allowed only among countries who do ratify. It
is also expected that it will not be allowed with the countries that would not
fulfill their obligations under the Protocol.
Finally, the Protocol comes automatically into force9 only if (i) at least 55
Parties to the Convention have ratified it, and (ii) these 55 Parties include a
number of Annex 1 Parties accounting for at least 55% of the base year CO2
emissions of all Annex I Parties to the Convention.
                                                
9 In Kyoto, the  text of the protocol was adopted unanimously by the delegates of the 159 countries
that participated in the negotiations. Signature of the text by governments and ratification by
parliaments are the following stages of the process.6
While parties are committing themselves to proceed to enforcement
within their country, no sanctions are specified if a ratifying country does not
fulfill its obligations under the Protocol, except for the above provision on
being excluded from emissions trading. A compliance regime, including
possible sanctions for non-compliance, is yet to be specified in the process of
future negotiations.
3. Economics of the issues at stake
Consider the n countries of the world (indexed below i = 1, ...,n), who each
enjoy an aggregate consumption level xi , equal to the aggregate value of their
production activities yi , minus the damage Di consisting in lost production that
results from global pollution. Each country  i's productive activity entails
indeed some amount of polluting emissions ei, that are related with production
according to the increasing and strictly concave production function10 yi  = gi






they affect production possibilities in each country11 in a way that is usually






simplicity we assume to be linear. Each country's consumption possibilities are
thus given by the expression






where di > 0 is thus the damage cost per unit of emission or, equivalently, the
benefit per unit of abatement (for decreasing  S ej ).
3.1  World optimality
Ignoring distributional issues, world consumption optimality can then be





xi with respect to the n
variables     e1, ... ,en. Let     (e1
*, ... ,en
*) be the vector of emission levels in the  n
countries that achieves such a world optimum. First order conditions for a
maximum are given by the following system of equations expressing equality
                                                
10 We may think of ei either as the energy input in the production, or as the pollution emission,
assuming that a unit of energy generates a unit of pollutant as a byproduct. Accordingly,
   g'i(ei) = dgi(ei)/dei) ( ) may be interpreted either as the marginal product of energy or (for
decreasing  ei ) the marginal cost of abatement, depending upon the context.
11 Numerical estimates of damages in some regions of the world are given in Table 1 below.7
between the marginal cost of global damages and the marginal abatement cost
of each party i :
  




dj = 0, i=1,...,n. (2)
We shall develop our arguments below under the assumption that climate
change negotiations are aiming at achieving such a world optimum. Attaining it
requires coordination among the countries, so as to ensure that each one of
them does take into account the effect of its emissions on the other countries as
reflected by their damage cost functions.
3.2  Non cooperative equilibrium
 It is indeed often argued12 that in the absence of coordination countries
choose emission policies that best suit their own interest, taking as given what
the other countries do. This leads to consider that a non cooperative
equilibrium of some sort prevails between countries if no negotiations take
place.
How would a country determine its best emissions levels? The answer is
not immediate since imposing to itself low emissions implies low net
production according to the function    gi, whereas allowing for high emissions
entails high damage costs according to the function Di .  Classical economic
reasoning suggests that a rational domestic optimum for each country would
be one that best balances these two aspects; it is achieved by maximizing its
own consumption level xi with respect to ei  as defined in (1), taking as given all
variables  ej with  j  ￿  i. If all countries adopt such a behavior, a Nash-type
equilibrium between countries prevails, that we represent by the vector of
emissions13
   (e  1,...,e  n). For each country  i, the first order condition of its
maximizing behavior is given by the equation
  ¢  g  i(e  i ) - d i = 0 (3)
while its achievable consumption level is
  
x  i = gi(e  i) - di S
j= 1
n
e  j .
                                                
12 see e.g.  CHANDER and TULKENS 1992
13 Uniqueness of this vector is ensured under our assumptions of concavity of the functions    gi
and of linearity of the functions Di .8
Two characteristics of the non cooperative equilibrium so defined are
essential for our purposes:  (i) the equilibrium emissions     (e  1,...,e  n)  are clearly
not a world optimum as can be seen from comparing (2) and (3): that is why
negotiations are necessary; and (ii)     e  i > ei
* for each i since gi is concave and




dj > di for all i's ; thus, world optimal emissions are lower than those
prevailing at the non cooperative equilibrium.
3.3  Coalitional stability for the treaty
The basic reason for the non optimality of the Nash Equilibrium is a well
known externality argument. Each country decides its emission level    e  i without
concern for the effects on other countries: it thus equates its marginal abatement
cost,    g'i(e i), to its own marginal damage cost, di , whereas a world optimum
requires each country to equate its marginal abatement cost to the aggregate






Furthermore, a world optimum may require from the various countries
different levels of abatement    e  i -ei
*, entailing costs and benefits that are a priori
by no means identical across them: some may have high abatement costs while
having only small damage costs to avoid, whereas other countries may have
low abatement costs while facing high damage costs. To have the world
optimum voluntarily agreed upon by all countries requires in addition that for
each country and  for  each group of countries the benefits exceed the costs of
abatement. Because of the asymmetries just mentioned, this can be achieved
only by means of appropriately designed resource transfers from the net
gainers to the net losers.
To that effect CHANDER and TULKENS 1997 have proposed that the




) specified in the treaty be accompanied by a
scheme of transfers (   T1 ,...,Tn) which are of the form:
  























where    Ti> 0 if the transfer is received by country i, while    Ti< 0  if the transfer is
paid14. The first expression within braces is equal to the abatement cost borne
                                                
14 The transfers are expressed here in units of physical goods. The issue whether it is preferable
that such transfers be financial rather than in real terms is an important one, that we cannot deal
with here.9
by country i from moving from its Nash equilibrium level of emissions    e  i to the
level    ei
*
 prescribed by world optimality. As this amount is positive in (4), the
rôle of this part of the transfer appears to be to cover that cost increase for i. The
second expression within braces is the world total over all countries of their
emissions abatement cost from the Nash equilibrium levels to the world






account of the negative sign, the second term in (4) thus determines a







Ti = 0, so that these transfers would ensure a balanced budget if
an international agency were established for implementing them. Notice also
the role played by the reference emission levels    e  i in the design of the transfers
— a feature whose importance will be highlighted below.
The "coalitional stability" property claimed above for the Chander-
Tulkens proposal of optimality with transfers is that, in addition to making
each country individually better off compared to the Nash equilibrium, it also
makes every group of countries better off, compared to what they could get by
adopting any alternative arrangement among themselves, be it in terms of
emissions, or transfers, or both. For further reference in our arguments below,
let us be more precise on this property. Let W = {i = 1, ... , n} denote the set of all
countries of the world and    S￿ W  be any subset, or "coalition" of countries.
Then the best outcome that the members of  S could obtain by making
arrangements among themselves only — to be called a "partial agreement Nash
equilibrium with respect to S" (PANE w.r.t. S) — is the one resulting from the
emissions policy    (˜  e  1,...,˜  e  n) defined by, for the members of S,
  
(˜  e  i)i˛ S = argmax gi(ei
i˛S













and for the countries not in S:
  







￿ , j ˛W \S.
A PANE w.r.t. S is thus a Nash equilibrium between the countries in S acting
jointly and the remaining countries acting individually. It can be characterized
by the first-order conditions:10
     










A comparison of these conditions with (2) implies 
  






˜  e j = ej,j ˛W\S. Since in a PANE w.r.t.  S the countries within the coalition
coordinate their emissions so as to take into account of their effect on each
other, their emissions are lower compared to the Nash equilibrium. The
emissions of the countries outside of the coalition are however not lower. In
fact, they might be higher if the damage function is convex but not linear15.
Moreover, since total world emissions are lower in a PANE w.r.t.  S, the
countries outside the coalition are better off, although that is not the intention of
the coalition.
3. 4  Statics vs. dynamics
Thus far, and for most of the sequel, the above quantities xi  and ei  are
considered to be flows per unit of time. The damages from climate change are
however induced less by the flow of greenhouse gas emissions than by the
increase16 DS in their accumulated stock S in the atmosphere. At each time t,
DSt  is thus determined by a relation of the form
  




where according to climatic science common wisdom d @ 0.01 and k is of the
order of .5 (and slowly increasing over time).
The issues at stake have thereby an inherently dynamic component that is
by no means ignored in the economics literature on climate change; see e.g.
NORDHAUS and YANG 1996, or, for our part, GERMAIN, TOINT, TULKENS
and de ZEEUW 1998. One might therefore consider that world optimality is not
to be defined in terms of just one period emission, production and
consumption levels as we have done but, instead, of multiperiod emission
trajectories 
  
(e1t, ... ent)t=1,2,... { } and similarly for production and consumption.
                                                
15  This might also happen when the countries outside the coalition are not acting rationally but
following the business-as-usual policy, since the abatement by the coalition S  might result into
lower energy prices in the rest of the world. Ellerman and Decaux 1998 observe this phenomenon
in their computable general equilibrium model, and call it “leakages”.
16 usually taken with respect to pre-industrial times.11
While this more elaborate modeling has its merits, it turns out to be
unnecessary for our purposes. Indeed, one may have noted that the specific
object of the Kyoto Protocol is not trajectories of emissions: it is emissions levels
at some point in time (around17 2010). We therefore feel justified in working, in
the present paper, with the usual "static" or one period model18.
4. "No regrets", "business-as-usual" and other possible domestic non
cooperative policies at the pre-agreement stage
The non cooperative behavior described in section 3.2 is not the only one
conceivable of this kind. Indeed, the fulfillment of conditions (3) that
characterize it requires domestic policies to be designed and implemented,
involving an energy tax or appropriately priced pollution permits, so that the
energy price including the tax or the permits unit price be equal to the domestic
marginal damage cost di  . These belong to the class of what is often called "no
regret policies". However, not all countries can be said to have adopted such a
nationally rational course of action.
For instance, industrial firms in some countries may have strong lobbying
power and use it so as to obtain low energy prices. While still choosing, as
profit maximizers, energy use and emissions so that   ¢  g  i  be equal to the price of
energy (denoted henceforth as pi ), this results into emissions    e  i higher than    e  i
and such that    g'i(e  i ) < di, thus successfully preventing the nationally rational
policy to be adopted. If this behavior is assumed to prevail in all countries, a
different equilibrium — equally non cooperative — results, called by
NORDHAUS and YANG 1996 the "market solution" ("business-as-usual",
according to others).
Alternatively, energy importing countries facing balance of payments
problems may have introduced high taxes and domestic prices of energy: their
emission levels    e  i are then likely to be such that    g'i(e  i ) > di.
Finally, another reason why a nationally rational policy may not come
about is that firms in a country may simply not be profit maximizers, as it is
particularly the case with large public sector enterprises of non market
economies. In such cases, the domestic equilibria are neither of the "market" nor
of the "nationally rational" type, and energy prices do not induce any well
                                                
17 Actually an average over the years 2008-2012.
18 Nash equilibrium and optimal trajectories are determined and discussed in GERMAIN, TOINT,
TULKENS and de ZEEUW 1998.12
defined emissions policy — except for the fact of a generally low concern for
economical use of energy.
Our  point in this section is that in the situation prevailing at the pre-
negotiation stage, all three types of country behavior are likely to be present,
and we wish to illustrate this empirically with the data in Table 1 below.
We first note a similarity between the structure, across some major
countries,  of the average energy prices for three kinds of fossil fuels (first three
columns) on the one hand, and of the marginal abatement costs (fourth column)
on the other hand. In particular, it is seen that the energy prices in the US are
systematically lower  and so is the marginal cost of abatement19. Moreover, for
the three developed regions US, EU and Japan which are also market
economies, the higher the energy prices, the higher the marginal abatement
costs20. For the other countries we cannot say much, not only because of lack of
data but also because they are either non market or less developed, or both.
Second, we have an opportunity to characterize some domestic policies by
using equation (3) — according to which in countries that choose their emission
levels rationally, i.e. in the "no regrets sense", the marginal damage cost from
emissions must be equal to the marginal abatement cost and also to the average
energy prices. Indeed, the data in the table reveal that marginal abatement costs
are lower in the US compared to the EU and Japan (they are even lower than
those of a developing country like India). Now, it can hardly be the case that the
marginal damage cost for the US, the largest economy, be lower than that of the
EU or of Japan. Therefore, we have an indication that in the US, decisions
regarding emissions are determined by the "business-as-usual" policy rather
than optimized at the national level.
We indicate in the last column the type of pre-negotiation domestic
equilibrium we conjecture from the data to prevail in each region .
What is the relevance of these observations for our purposes in this




) are, as seen from (2),
independent of those at the pre-negotiation stage, the transfers Ti defined in (4)
may have to be modified with the    e  i's substituted by the actual emission levels
of each country i as they are described here. Does such a substitution affect the
                                                
19 In case of Japan, the marginal cost of abatement may look exceptionally high, but this is because
of its large dependence on nuclear energy and natural gas.
20 Coal in Japan is a noticeable exception; but its use there is considerably lower.13
coalitional stability property of the transfers? The answer is no21, as long as one
can assume that coutries do adopt the same behavior at the pre-agreement
stage and at a PANE when not in the colaition. For the sake of simplicity
however, we will continue to consider the    e  i's as Nash equilibrium emission
levels.
Table 1 — Retail prices (in US$ per unit) of industrial fossil fuels,
marginal abatement cost and damage cost





























US 138.00 35.27 136.62 $ 12 1.3
  ¢  g  i(e  i )= pi<di
EU 187.4 76.0 182.0 $ 40 1.4
  ¢  g  i(e  i )= pi‡di
Japan 172.86 49.90 423.12 $ 350 1.4
  ¢  g  i(e  i )= pi‡di
India 191.15 19.36 na $ 22 na ?
FSU na na na $ 22 0.7 ?
China na na na $ 3.5 4.7 ?
*Source: Energy Prices and Taxes  1996
**Source: ELLERMAN and DECAUX 1998
***Source:  FANKHAUSER 1995
                                                
21 In technical terms, because levels of the    e  i's higher than those of a Nash equilibrium induce a
larger core for the game whereby Chander and Tulkens 1997 establish the coalitional stability
property of the transfers (4).14
5. Kyoto quotas, worldwide trading and coalitional stability
5.1  The Kyoto quotas: not optimality, but a step in the right direction
While it is straightforward to define  and characterize a world optimum in
theory, as we have done in section 3, implementing it is undoubtedly difficult
in practice, for several reasons among which we identify four. First,
determining optimal emissions at the world level requires knowledge of, and





di  are, as well as
the countries' marginal abatement costs    ¢  g  i(ei). While "objective" technical
studies can provide some of that information, one can expect that, due to the
huge interests at stake in many segments of all concerned economies, pressures
are exerted for either concealing or simply not collecting the statistical material
required.
Secondly, because the achievement of a stable world optimum may
require, as noted earlier, resource transfers between the countries to
compensate those for which net benefits,i.e.  benefits minus costs, are low or
negative, institutions or mechanisms that hardly exist today are needed to
implement such transfers.
Thirdly, the reference emission levels e  i  — that play a rôle in the design of
the transfers (4) ensuring coalitional stability — may themselves be considered
unfair, typically by those countries that are in the early stages of their economic
development: they currently have comparatively low emission levels, while
developed countries have high ones. In the future, when they will be
developed, currently developing countries will have higher emissions and they
might argue that these should be used as reference levels instead of those of
today.
Finally, if reductions in emissions e  i  — ei
*
, are very large (as proposed by
some countries), they are simply not politically feasible, at least in the short
run. In fact, the Kyoto Protocol only requires relatively small reductions for the
immediate future (the next fifteen years), leaving further reductions for later
periods.
For all these reasons it is difficult to assess whether the emissions
reductions chosen by the Kyoto signatories correspond to world optimal
emissions.15
Yet, countries in Kyoto have agreed upon some scheme of quotas on their
emissions. Denote this scheme by the vector    (ˆ  e  1,..., ˆ  e  n) where    ˆ  e  i is the quota on
emissions of country i and write 
  
ˆ  e = S
i=1
n
ˆ  e  i for the so induced aggregate reduced





e  i, that is, the total sum of emissions
in 1990, these aggregate reduced emissions are for sure a step in the right
direction since irrespective of whether 1990 emissions are business-as-usual or
no regrets policies, both do imply too large emissions with respect to the world
optimum.
5.2  Efficiency of emissions trading
If the Kyoto aggregate emissions reduction to ê is achieved by letting each
country abide to its emissions quota and simply emit up to ei =    ˆ  e  i, the ensuing
aggregate gross world production, 
  










gi(ˆ  e  i), may not be the highest
achievable level. If so, the national policies  ei =     ˆ  e  i for each  i would be
inefficient. Alternative specifications of the countries' emissions ei, all achieving
ê, are conceivable. In fact, recalling (1), the highest possible world consumption
levels compatible with ê would be those given by the vector ê* =    (ˆ  e  1
*














ˆ  e  j] (5)








ˆ  e  i. (6)
How are these efficient emission levels to be determined? With
appropriate information on the production (or abatement cost) functions gi, this
could be done by computation. However, having argued above that such
information is hard to come by, it is likely that strong opposition would arise
against the computed emission levels, and in particular against those that
would be larger than    ˆ  e  i , which is indeed a possibility!
We want to show presently that the desired efficient emission levels are
precisely those that a competitive market equilibrium in tradable emission
quotas would determine; in other words, that tradability of quotas
automatically solves the problem (5)-(6).
                                                
22 Notice that for all non Annex 1 countries, we have    ˆ  e  i =e i.16
To this effect, notice first that the vector ê*=    (ˆ  e  1
*
,..., ˆ  e  n
*
) we are interested in













ˆ  e  i , (7)





ˆ  e  j are constants in (5).
Next, define a  competitive emissions trading equilibrium with respect to
(ˆ  e  1,..., ˆ  e  n)  as a vector of national emissions    (ˆ  e ' 1,...,ˆ  e  'n ) and a price  ˆ  g > 0 for CO2
(expressed in units of consumption goods per unit of CO2 emission) such that
for each country i = 1, ... , n,






ˆ  e  'i = S
i=1
n
ˆ  e  i. (9)
In such a competitive emissions trading equilibrium, the countries (typically
their firms, but conceivably also other economic agents) freely trade in their
pollution rights, equal to their emissions quotas (ˆ  e  1,..., ˆ  e  n) , at the given price  ˆ  g ,
and at that price, demand and supply of pollution rights are equal23. The
magnitudes    ˆ  g (ˆ  e  i -ˆ ¢  e i) represent the value, in private goods, of payments for the
purchase, at world price  ˆ  g , of quotas if     (ˆ  e  i - ˆ ¢  e  i), the amount purchased, is
negative, or of receipts from the sale of quotas if    (ˆ  e  i - ˆ ¢  e  i), the amount sold, is
positive.
Clearly the vector    (ˆ  e ' 1,...ˆ  e  'n ) defined by (8)-(9) is also the one that solves





gi(ˆ  e  'i )+ ˆ  g S
i=1
n













ˆ  e  i.
As a confirmation, it can be seen from the first order condition for (8) that at the
price  ˆ  g   the equality     gi(ˆ  e i')= ˆ  g  is satisfied for all  i's, implying that
   gi(ˆ  e  i')=gj(ˆ  e j') for all i, j = 1, ... , n, a necessary condition for a solution of (5)-(6).
                                                
23 Existence and uniqueness of a competitive emissions trading equilibrium follow from concavity
of the functions gi  and continuity arguments.17
Trading thus allows countries to achieve the aggregate emissions
reduction ê with the highest level of world consumption compatible with this
reduction or, in other words, at the lowest opportunity cost for the world. This
holds even if for some countries    (ˆ  e  i - ˆ ¢  e  i) is negative: the point is indeed that
world consumption be maximized and not that all countries necessarily emit    ˆ ¢  e  i
lower than    ˆ  e  i.
 5.3  Coalitional stability of competitive trading
If trade in emissions is allowed another question arises: shall there be
blocks of countries forming in emissions trading? We answer the question in
this section by means of a simple argument based on the theory of market
games.
Let    S￿ W  be a block of countries whose members would decide, given
the vector    (êi)i˛ S of their individual Kyoto quotas, to adopt some joint policy of
their own for meeting their aggregate quota,    ˆ  e  i i˛S ￿ , such as e.g. trading only
among themselves, or engaging in other bilateral or multilateral agreements
that fulfill the same condition. To characterize the economic effect of the
formation of such a block , define
   v(S)  =  Max    Si˛Sgi(ei)   subject to     Si˛Sei = Si˛Sˆ  e i, (10)
that is, is the maximum total gross24 output that the countries in the block S can
hope to jointly achieve given their aggregate emissions constraint.
Consider now again    (ˆ  e ' 1,...ˆ  e 'n), the world competitive emissions trading
equilibrium with respect to (ˆ  e  1,..., ˆ  e  n) . If we can show that the members of S are
better off at that worldwide competitive equilibrium than at their best actions
as a separate block (as identified in (10)), we shall have established that block S
has no interest to form, thus answering in the negative the question raised in
this section.
This is in fact straightforward. Indeed, with our notation it amounts to
show that
   Si˛Sgi( ¢  ˆ  e  i) ‡v(S), (11)
that is,  using (8), that
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But this inequality is true since from concavity of gi  we have for each i in S
   gi(ˆ  e  'i )+ ˆ  g (˜  e  i - ˆ  e  'i ) ‡ gi(˜  e  i) , (12)
using the fact that     ˆ  g  = ¢  g  i(ˆ ¢  e i) at the world competitive emissions trading
equilibrium25.
Repeating this argument for any conceivable block of countries leads to
the conclusion that no block has an interest to form26, once a competitive
emissions trading equilibrium prevails at the world level.
We have thus shown that the outcome of competitive trade in emissions
among the countries cannot be improved upon by the formation of coalitions of
countries, such as e.g. trading blocks. We are thereby rediscovering — in fact,
just applying — a general property of market equilibria known as their "core"
property, which says that such equilibria belong to the core of some
appropriately formulated cooperative game27.
                                                
25 and irrespective of whether    (˜  e  i - ˆ  e ' i )  is positive or negative.
26 Not only no block S taken in the aggregate, as formulated in (11), but also each member of the
block, as (12) shows
27 In technical game theoretical terms, the expression v(S)  defined above is the payoff that S can
achieve for its members and any vector   
(ei )i˛S that meets the condition    ei i˛ S ￿ = ˆ  e  i i˛S ￿  is an
emissions strategy for  S. Then the pair [ W, v ]  satisfies the definition of a n-person game in
characteristic function form where v is the function v : 2W ˘ ‹  defined by (10). A strategy for the
grand coalition  W ,     (ei)i˛W , is said to be in the core of this game if for each     S￿ W ,
   Si˛Sgi(ei) ‡v(S). That there exists such a strategy, that is, that the core of our game is non
empty can be asserted in general terms by showing that the game is balanced (in the sense of
SHAPLEY 1967). But we provide above the same positive answer in an economically more
interesting way by exhibiting an actual strategy for  W — namely the equilibrium outcome of
worldwide competitive emissions trading — that we show to belong to the core. Notice that the
cooperative game defined here (and hence its core) is  not the same as the one proposed in
CHANDER and TULKENS 1995,1997. The present game is a pure market game where
externalities play no rôle since, once the quotas are fixed, the public good aspect of the problem
disappears. One is left with only the private goods-type problem of allocating the emissions
between the countries. It is worth pointing out, finally, that the game is one for an economy with
production, and not of the usual pure exchange type.19
5.4  Desirability of worldwide  and competitive trading
While the Kyoto Protocol can be seen as allowing for trading in emissions
among the Annex 1 or more parties, it leaves open the questions of the extent
and nature of such trading28. Economic and game theoretic considerations can
be further called upon to resolve these questions.
As to the extent of trading, that is, the number of participants in the trade,
market equilibrium theory makes a case in favor of emissions trading with the
largest number of traders possible. Thus, worldwide emissions trading is desirable.
This is implied by the previous argument on subgroups, be they trading blocks
or any other form of "coalitions". Indeed, if it is not to the benefit of any such
subgroup of countries to form and act independently of the other countries, the
outcome is also not more beneficial for these other countries, if a subgroup were to
form  This is because their only best actions would be to act also as a subgroup,
and for this subgroup the inequality (11) also applies.
We claim on that basis that it is in the world's overall economic interest
that non Annex 1 countries, whose emissions are not subject to quotas, be
nevertheless allowed to participate in the trading process. The clean
development mechanism (CDM) contains provisions to that effect. A policy
implication of our claim is that this mechanism be designed so as to make it as
open as possible to the largest number of countries. The fact that no quotas was
assigned to many countries is irrelevant to the beneficial property, both for the
world in general and for those countries in particular,  of a worldwide
emissions trading equilibrium.
As to the nature of trading, the same body of theory advocates that the
institutions governing the trades be designed so as to ensure that they be as
competitive as possible — competitiveness meaning here that all participants
behave as price takers. It is indeed only for markets with that property that
efficiency, coalitional stability and worldwide maximal benefits are established.
Regulatory provisions that would result in restricting competitiveness in
the emissions trading process are thus to be avoided, just as well as the absence
of regulations designed to prevent restrictions to competition. Such are, for
instance, provisions allowing for market power to be exerted by some traders
so as to influence price formation to their advantage, as well as regulatory
                                                
28 To be addressed at the Conference of Parties in Buenos Aires in November 1998.20
controls that would impede sufficient price flexibility; or still, as proposed by
some, the capping of the quantities that participants are allowed to trade on.
As is well known, the larger the number of participants, the more
competitive the market is likely to be: our argument favoring a large extent of
the market is thus also one that favors competition29. Large numbers are
admittedly neither the only way nor a sufficient condition to ensure the
competitive character of a market, but they are a powerful factor.
5.5  A numerical illustration
Using the carbon emissions reduction commitments made by the Annex 1
parties to the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the marginal cost abatement curves
generated by MIT’s EPPA model (which is a multi-regional, multi-sectoral
computable General Equilibrium model of economic activity, energy use and
carbon emissions), ELLERMAN and DECAUX 1998 develop a method for
estimating quantitatively the outcome in 2010 of various trading regimes,
including the world competitive emissions trading equilibrium. They highlight
the substantial differences in the outcome of the various trading regimes —
confirming our theoretical claim of maximal efficiency of worldwide trading,
but they leave open the question of which one might be agreed upon by the
parties to the Protocol.
Our analysis above brings an answer to this question, again in favor of
world competitive emissions trading, based on showing that strategic
behaviour of coalitions of countries cannot be more beneficial to them than
worldwide emissions trading. For illustrative purposes we reproduce here (see
Table 2) Ellerman and Decaux's estimate of the world competitive emissions
trading equilibrium in 2010 and of its price    ˆ  g  at that time which is US$/ton
24.75.
6. Beyond the Kyoto quotas: towards a world coalitionally stable optimum
The outcome of the competitive emissions trading equilibrium with
respect to the Kyoto quotas (ˆ  e  1,..., ˆ  e  n)  is described in the last row of Table 2. It is
seen that it results into monetary transfers among the countries and equalizes
their marginal costs of abatement. This equilibrium thus very much looks like
                                                
29 With large numbers, our previous argument on the rôle of markets to achieve coalitional
stability is also reinforced by a central result in economic theory (due to DEBREU  and SCARF
1963, elaborating on EDGEWORTH 1881) according to which the  only coalitionally stable
outcome (in our case, the only emissions allocation with that property) is the competitive one.21
the worldwide treaty described above (Chander and Tulkens 1997) which also
requires transfers among the countries and equalizes their marginal costs of
abatement (see (2) and (4)), except for the fact that that treaty leads to the




) while the Kyoto quotas do not.
This prompts our final question: could an appropriate emission quotas
and trading scheme of the Kyoto type nevertheless be used to reach a world
optimum with the same coalitional stability property as ensured by the
Chander-Tulkens transfers?. The answer is yes, because that optimum can be
shown to be equivalent to an emission quotas and trading scheme.
To that effect define quotas     (ˆ  e  1
*
,..., ˆ  e  n
*
) from the optimal emissions




) and the reference emissions (e  1,...,e  n) such that for each country i,
  








S j ˛ Wgj(e j) - S j˛Wgj(ej
*) ( ). (13)
The left hand side of this expression is what country i pays (or receives) if it
buys (sells) emission rights in amount     (ˆ  e  i
*-ei
*) at a price 
  
ˆ  g = S
j˛ W
dj. This
suggests that     (e1
*,...,en
*)  and 
  
ˆ  g = S
j˛ W
dj are nothing else than a competitive
emissions trading equilibrium with respect to the quotas    (ˆ  e  1
*,...,ˆ  e  n
*), in the sense
of (8)-(9). And the right hand side is precisely the Chander and Tulkens transfer
Ti advocated in Section 3 (see (4)) above to achieve optimality in a coalitionally
stable way.




) as defined in (2)
are independent of the reference emission levels (e  1,...,e  n) as defined in (3), the
emission quotas    (ˆ  e  1
*,...,ˆ  e  n
*) as defined in (13) are not. In fact, since the optimal
emissions are independent of reference emissions, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between     (ˆ  e  1
*
,..., ˆ  e  n
*
) and  (e  1,...,e  n). This means that if the
reference emission levels (e  1,...,e  n) are not in dispute, then the emission quotas
   (ˆ  e  1
*,...,ˆ  e  n
*) along with competitive emissions trading would also be acceptable
to all countries since by definition these would not only lead to the optimum




) but also to transfers that would make each country or
group of countries better-off compared to (e  1,...,e  n).
The significance of this shift in perspective lies in the fact that, as noted
earlier, the currently considered reference emission levels (e  1,...,e  n) are felt to
be unfair, typically by the countries that are in the early steps of economic22
development with comparatively low emission levels. Therefore, the emissions
of such countries may not be subjected to quotas, as agreed upon at Kyoto, at
least until the time when their emission levels become comparable to those of
Annex 1 countries. With time their emissions will rise as a result of economic
development and those of the Annex 1 countries will fall as a result of
abatement. While the Kyoto Protocol is a step in the right direction in terms of
the actual emissions, we are suggesting here that the effective ultimate aim
should in fact be to reach an agreement on appropriate reference emission
levels (or pollution rights) (e  1,...,e  n) at some future round of negotiations.
The discussion in t he preceding paragraph clarifies that once an
agreement is reached regarding reference emissions  (e  1,...,e  n) then an
agreement would also be reached regarding the target emission quotas
   (ˆ  e  1
*
,..., ˆ  e  n
*
) and competitive emissions trading which by definition lead to




) and transfers that ensure coalitional stability.
Such an agreement requires the countries first to agree on equity
principles to be adopted, as for instance per capita or per unit of GDP
emissions. The currently considered baselines of business-as-usual Nash
equilibrium or historically grandfathered emissions are known to be
problematic. Something else seems to be required, making explicit room, for
instance, to principles like the one of "common but differentiated
responsibilities". If such new reference levels can be agreed upon, our analysis
suggests that a quotas and trading scheme of the kind pioneered in Kyoto is an
appropriate tool to reach stable world optimality in the future.23
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